SOCIO-ECONOMICS, POLITICS and CULTURE in the most popular country in the CHRISTIAN WORLD

Monday, April 23, 2007

SC Chief on War on Terror --inquirer ; CJ Puno Speaks to Today’s Youth on Terrorism

SC chief says war on terror mindless


RP rights violations linked to US strategy

By Leila Salaverria

Inquirer

Last updated 05:41am (Mla time) 04/23/2007


MANILA, Philippines -- Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato Puno has denounced as “mindless” the war on terrorism, saying the US strategy to root out terrorists anywhere has led to violations of human rights in the Philippines.

In an impassioned plea for respect of human rights, the country’s top jurist also warned that a state hobbled by credibility problems and corruption would not be able to protect civil liberties.

“The war on terrorism has inevitable spillover effects on human rights all over the world, especially in countries suspected (of) being used as havens of terrorists,” Puno said. He added this had led to the taking of legal shortcuts.

“These shortcuts have scarred the landscape of [human] rights in the Philippines,” he said.

The United States has hailed the Philippines as a major ally in its war on terror in Asia and has been training Filipino troops in the campaign against foreign-backed extremists operating in southern Philippines.

“The threats to our national security and human rights will be aggravated if we have a state weakened internally by a government hobbled by corruption, struggling with credibility, battling the endless insurgence of the left and the right, and by a state weakened externally by pressure exerted by creditor countries, by countries where our trade comes from, by countries that supply our military and police armaments,” Puno said.

“A weak state cannot fully protect the rights of its citizens within its borders just as a state without economic independence cannot protect the rights of its citizens who are abroad from the exploitation of more powerful countries.”

Puno spoke at the commencement exercises of the University of the East last week, and a copy of his speech was e-mailed to reporters by the Supreme Court information office.


Eliminating the evil

Puno said that terrorism was terrible enough “but the mindless, knee-jerk reaction to extirpate the evil is more discomforting.”

He added that the “quickie solution is to unfurl the flag, sing the national anthem, and issue the high-pitched call to arms for the military and the police to use their weapons under the theme ‘victory at all costs.’”

He said laws limiting individual rights in the name of state security had been passed.

“To put constitutional cosmetics to the military-police muscular efforts, lawmakers usually enact laws using security of the state to justify the diminution of human rights by allowing arrests without warrants, surveillance of suspects, interception and recording of communications, seizure or freezing of bank deposits, assets and records of suspects,” he added.

“They also redefine terrorism as a crime against humanity and the redefinition is broadly drawn to constrict and shrink further the zone of individual rights.”


RP’s anti-terror law

Puno made no specific mention of the Philippines’ own anti-terror law, the Human Security Act of 2007, which allows warrantless arrests, surveillance and seizure of bank assets, among others.

His statements were the latest to emanate from a judiciary which several times in the past had expressed concern over the violation of civil liberties in the country.

In previous decisions, the Supreme Court had struck down presidential or state directives involving security matters. These included President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s imposition of emergency rule last year and the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy allowing police to break up street demonstrations.

It also voided the recent arrest by the police of leftist leader Rep. Satur Ocampo.

Puno also said the acts of terrorists also violated human rights but they should not be the sole focus of the people’s attention, pointing out that terrorism tended to draw attention because of the “cinematic impact” of violence.


Lesson from history

“If there is any lesson that we can derive from the history of human rights, it is none other than that these rights cannot be obliterated by bombs but neither can they be preserved by bullets alone,” Puno said.

Puno said that in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks, the United States -- “the worst victim of terrorism” -- pursued a strategy of “bruising aggressiveness” that sent legal observers wondering.

He said the effects of US actions had spilled over to the Philippines.

He pointed out that the US did not even wait for the United Nations to act and instead launched attacks against terrorists wherever they could be found.

“In less polite parlance, the search and destroy strategy gave little respect to the sovereignty of states and violated their traditional borders,” he said.

He added that this strategy trampled on the basic liberties of suspected terrorists, “for laws are silent when the guns of war do the talking.”


Legal shortcuts

“One visible result of the scramble to end terrorism is to take legal shortcuts and legal shortcuts always shrink the scope of human rights,” he said.

Puno cited the escalation of extrajudicial killings in the country which got the attention of international groups, and reports of how the New People’s Army rebels themselves “lawlessly retaliated” for such killings.

Puno also said poverty was a form of terrorism.

“In poor countries, it is poverty that truly terrorizes people for they are terrorized by the thought that they will die because of empty stomachs and not that they will lose their lives due to some invisible suicide bombers,” he said.

He also said this lack of resources led to the violation of poor people’s human rights because they did not dare participate in a slow-moving justice system that would only cost them money.

It does not matter exactly how many poor people there are in the Philippines, he said, citing news reports quoting the World Bank as saying 15 million people in the country survive on less than $1 a day against a government claim that only 10.5 million Filipinos live on such an amount.

He said the fact was that the country continued to be beset by poverty.


Everybody’s concern

“To the unsophisticated in the esoterics of economics, this is a distinction without difference for the cruel fact is that poverty stalks this land of plenty and hunger is still the best food seasoning of its people,” he said.

Puno also said the campaign against terror had led to a massive displacement of young people from their areas.

He warned: “It will not take a prophet to predict that countries that cannot give decent life to their young people will serve as incubators of extremism that may end up in terrorism.”

Puno said protecting human rights was everybody’s burden and that the apathy of fence-sitters was the worst enemy of human rights since it allowed violations to continue.

“The apathy of those who can make a difference is the reason why violations of human rights continue to prosper. The worst enemy of human rights is not its non-believers but the fence-sitters who will not lift a finger despite their violations,” he said.


Right to live with dignity

He also said the fight against terrorism and the battle to preserve human rights would affect the youth’s right to live with dignity. It could lead to their massive displacement in areas where the fight against terrorism trampled on human rights.

The rich and powerful should also not ignore the protection of the rights of the poor and powerless just because they remained unaffected, he said.


Incursions

“Sooner or later, they will find that they who default in protecting the rights of the many will end up without rights like the many,” he said.

“With the incursions and threats of incursion to our human rights at this crucial moment in our history, the clarion call to each one of us is to consecrate our lives to the great cause of upholding our human rights,” Puno said.



Copyright 2007 Inquirer. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.



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Chief Justice Puno Speaks to Today’s Youth on Terrorism


Posted: April 18, 2007
By Jay B. Rempillo


Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno challenged today’s youth to share the burden of safeguarding the country’s national security and the obligation of protecting human rights.

Speaking at today’s commencement exercises of the University of the East, where he was conferred a Doctor of Laws degree, honoris causa, at the University Theatre, UE Campus in C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, Chief Justice Puno told the UE graduates that a country’s security interest “is a collective interest where everybody has a significant stake.”

“The business of safeguarding our national security and the obligation of protecting human rights is a burden shared by all of us. It is not only the military that should tackle our problem of security for it is our security that is at stake, not their security,” he said. He added that “the apathy of those who can make a difference is the reason why violations of human rights continue to prosper. The worst enemy of human rights is not its nonbelievers but the fence sitters who will not lift a finger despite their violations.”

Chief Justice Puno stressed that the fight against terrorism and the battle to preserve human rights have high impact on the right of young people to live with dignity. He cautioned that there is massive displacement of young people as they migrate to areas where the fight against terrorism tramples on human rights, saying that “these young people are compelled to migrate to seek greener pastures in hostile environments and worse, where they find their human rights subjected to new abuses with near impunity.”

According to him, the problem of displacement will get worse in the coming years because of the galloping growth of the youth population. He noted that “the United Nations predicts that some 138 countries will have growing ‘youth bulge’; its calamitous consequence is that youth unemployment will skyrocket to record levels with the highest rate in the Middle East and North Africa.” Furthermore, the UN findings showed that at least 60 million people aged 15-20 will not be able to find work and about 130 million “cannot lift their families out of poverty.”

In fighting terrorism, Chief Justice Puno said that people should not overlook the non-military aspects of our national security and their impact on human rights. He said that in a poor country, terrorism is synonymous to poverty. “It is poverty that truly terrorizes people for they are terrorized by the thought that they will die because of empty stomachs and not that they will lose their lives due to some invisible suicide bombers. In poor countries, it is also poverty that renders the poor vulnerable to violation of their rights, for the poor will not vindicate their rights in a justice system that moves in slow motion and whose wheels have to be greased with money,” he said. He added that “our national security and our human rights are more threatened by the fear that we face an environmental collapse if we do not take immediate steps to save our seas and our forests from the despoliation to satisfy the economic greed of the few.”

The Chief Justice further stressed that threats to our national security and human rights will be aggravated if we have a state weakened internally by a government hobbled by corruption, struggling with credibility, battling the endless insurgence, and weakened externally by pressure exerted by creditor countries that control our trade and supply our military and police armaments. “A weak state cannot fully protect the rights of its citizens within its borders, just as a state without economic independence cannot protect the rights of its citizens who are abroad from the exploitation of more powerful countries,” he said.

The chief magistrate also warned of the escalation of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines, which has already reached the attention of international advocates of human rights. Presently, the High Court has already designated about a hundred Regional Trial Courts nationwide to hear, try, and decide cases of extrajudicial killings in order to address this pressing problem.




From SC Court News Flash April 2007

Sunday, April 22, 2007

Iraq returns to its Persian heritage --LA Times; Sunni struggle claims 4th Fallujah chief --Yahoo! News

Iraq returns to its Persian heritage

Its newly ascendant Shiites no longer have to suppress their Persian roots, which tie them closely to Iran.


By Borzou Daragahi, Times Staff Writer
April 16, 2007


NAJAF, IRAQ — Persian script laces and flows across the walls of Najaf's seminaries.

Shiite Muslim religious scholars in the ancient city's turquoise-tiled edifices bury their noses in Koranic texts illustrated with Persian calligraphy, in scenes that evoke Mesopotamia's rich history.

For centuries, Najaf has been a key shrine city and center of worship for much of Iraq's people. But for centuries, Iraq's Ottoman and Arab rulers rarely considered Najaf part of their own history. It was always considered a troublesome outpost of the enemy: Iran.

They were right, for the most part. Historically and culturally, Najaf has long been under Persia's sway.

But so has much of Iraq.

The reading of the Koran in this country differs from the rest of the Muslim world: The rhythm and cadence of Sunnis are unique to Iraq and the Shiites' are unique to Iran. Persian dishes such as fesenjan, a pomegranate stew, are a standard part of Mesopotamian fare. Even this nation's capital carries a Persian name, Baghdad.

The sectarian nature of the war between Shiite and Sunni Arabs in Iraq reflects a centuries-old battle between Persia and the Arab world.

It is a point often misunderstood by U.S. policymakers and ground commanders, who perceive the reemergence of Persian influence among Iraq's newly powerful Shiite Muslim majority as proof of meddling by the regime in Tehran.

Rising Persian influence is a sign of Iraq's ascendance, not Iran's.

"Iraq has been part of the Persian sphere of influence for more than 400 years," said Karar Dastour, an Iraqi Shiite intellectual who lives in southern Tehran and travels to Iraq. "But governments have always tried to crush anything that had the scent of Shiism or Iran. They were never accepted."

Violent Sunni Arab rejection of Iraq's Persian roots plays out daily on the streets of the capital. In February, three bombs went off in the Shorja market in central Baghdad, killing more than 70 people. It was the fifth time the place, whose name means "salty well" in Persian, was struck in less than a year. Shiite Muslims were the intended targets, but so too was a landmark established long ago by Iranian merchants.

When saboteurs blew up the Golden Mosque in Samarra last year, an attack widely viewed as the accelerant of the current civil war, they destroyed the handiwork of Iranian artisans.

In their Internet postings, Sunni Arab insurgents, many of them officers during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, describe their attacks on Shiites as settling accounts with "Safavids," a reference to the 16th century dynasty that embraced Shiite Islam as the official religion of Persia. Shiite Safavids and Sunni Ottomans fought for decades in a conflict that infused sectarianism into what had been a centuries-old ethnic and political conflict between Arabs and Persians.

"There has always been conflict between the Arabs and Iranians, and they always tried to involve Iraq," Sheik Humam Hamoodi, an Iraqi Shiite politician and cleric who lived in Tehran during Saddam Hussein's rule, said in an interview last year. "Both have wanted to use Iraq as the trench for their battles."

Ignoring the protests of many Shiites, the British forces who forged modern-day Iraq after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire placed a Sunni Arab tribal leader at the country's helm. They dismissed the quarrelsome Shiite clerics as Iranian-backed interlopers in their plans to create an Iraq dominated by Sunni Arabs.



Minority rule

Iraq's 20th century leaders tried to graft a Sunni-dominated Arab identity onto a country that was majority Shiite. Even during the relatively benign years before Hussein's rise in the late 1960s, Shiites visiting Sunni Arab towns such as Tikrit and Fallouja feared for their lives. Pilgrims visiting Samarra, which housed the famous Shiite shrine destroyed by Sunni insurgents last year, rushed to make it back to Baghdad by sundown.

The battle over Iraq's identity accelerated under Hussein, who brutally suppressed what he saw as the non-Arab elements of his country's character. Hussein equated Persians to "flies," invaded Iran and subsequently killed tens of thousands of Iraqi Kurds and Shiites, dubbing them Iranian collaborators.

Hussein banned ceremonies of Ashura, the annual festival-like holiday commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, revered by Shiites as a saint. He ordered the desecration of Shiite shrines and the silencing and execution of the sect's clerics, many of them of Persian descent or married into Persian families. Offices and banks were ordered to stay open on Nowruz, the Persian New Year that falls on the first day of spring and is celebrated by Iraqi Kurds as well as Iranians, Tajiks and Afghans.

"There was a sectarian dimension and there was an ethnic dimension to his hatred," said Musayeb Naimi, editor of Al-Wifaq, a Tehran-based Arabic-language newspaper. Hussein's downfall after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 ended the enforced separation between Iran and Iraq, much to the frustration and rage of Iraq's long-dominant Sunni Arabs. Industrially incapacitated, Iraq must import electricity, foodstuffs, appliances and automobiles from Iran and other neighboring countries such as Turkey and Syria.

Persian cultural influences, long suppressed, have reemerged in the last four years. After Hussein's ouster, Iranian and Iraqi Shiites embraced during mass commemorations of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, rites once banned under Baath Party rule.

Those rites have now become symbols of Shiite power. Sunni insurgents repeatedly attacked the pilgrims headed to Karbala last month, killing more than 200.

Persian has become common on the streets of Najaf and Karbala, as well as in Baghdad's Convention Center, where the Iraqi parliament convenes. Colorful posters of imams Ali and Hussein, of the kind found in pious Iranian enclaves, appear more frequently in Iraqi markets and homes.

Young Iraqi women have begun wearing the same Grace Kelly-style head scarves and short overcoats favored by Iranians.

Motorcycles, popular among youths in Iran but banned during Hussein's rule, traverse Baghdad streets, as do the heroin and opium that have become a habit for young Iranians.



Unease among Sunnis

To many Sunni Arabs, all those have been disturbing signs of a Persian ascendancy.

Brought up on a diet of Arab nationalist propaganda, Sunni Iraqis see their country's drift into the Persian sphere of influence as foreign. At first Sunni insurgents attacked mostly U.S. troops, whom they saw as an occupation force. But as the Shiite-dominated government took hold in early 2005, the attacks took a sharply sectarian turn. Seconds before his execution, Hussein cursed both the Americans who overthrew him and the "Persians" who shouted populist Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr's name as he stood on the gallows.

A bitter Jan. 2 television debate about Hussein's legacy on the satellite channel Al Jazeera underscored the ethnic underpinnings of Sunni Arab rage against Iraq's new Shiite order.

The debate pitted Mishaan Jaburi, a Sunni Arab politician, against Sadeq Moussawi, a Shiite journalist and supporter of the current government.

During the debate, which was posted on the Internet and rapidly became famous here, Jaburi waved sheets of white paper at Moussawi, screaming, "These are your documents! You are an Iranian citizen …. You are Persian."

"Your father killed Kurds," Moussawi snapped back.

"You are Iranian," Jaburi reiterated. "These documents show that [you] applied for Iraqi citizenship in May 2004."

Moussawi didn't bother denying the accusation. "We will settle accounts with all of you," he said instead.

Yet many of Iraq's Persian-influenced citizens are neither loyal to nor fond of the government in Tehran. Many Shiites fought on Iraq's side in the war against Iran. And most Iraqis who sought shelter in Iran during Hussein's rule experienced hardship and bigotry. But culturally and politically, they cleave toward Iran instead of Washington's preferred proxy powers — Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Iraqi Shiites have some leaders, including the cleric Sadr, who are Arab nationalists. In the last year, however, many of them have strayed from the Arab world, angered that Arab countries have shunned Iraq's newly crystallizing Shiite identity.

Persians and Shiism have become so intertwined that opposition to Tehran's policies across the region has taken on a Sunni character. Ethnic Baluchi separatists in southeastern Iran fight under the banner of a Sunni Muslim group linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. And in a growing number of cases, Iran's Shiite Arab separatists have converted to Sunni Islam.

Even as Sunnis fight Shiites, accusing them of being Iranians, Shiites have begun to whisper about the identity of Iraq's Sunnis.

"The Sunnis of Iraq aren't really Arabs," one Iraqi Shiite diplomat said recently. "They're Turks."



daragahi@latimes.com

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Daragahi, The Times' former Baghdad Bureau chief, first traveled to Iraq in September 2002. Times staff writer Raheem Salman in Baghdad and special correspondents Saad Fakhrildeen in Najaf and Ramin Mostaghim in Tehran contributed to this report.



 
Copyright 2007 Los Angeles Times



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Sunni struggle claims 4th Fallujah chief --Yahoo!® News




By SINAN SALAHEDDIN, Associated Press Writer




BAGHDAD - The Fallujah city council chairman, a critic of al-Qaida who took the job after his three predecessors were assassinated, was killed on Saturday, the latest blow in a violent internal Sunni struggle for control of an insurgent stronghold west of Baghdad.



In the capital, U.S. and Iraqi officials defended plans to build a barrier around a Sunni enclave to protect its inhabitants from surrounding Shiite areas, while residents expressed concern it would isolate the community.

Sami Abdul-Amir al-Jumaili was gunned down by attackers in a passing car as he was walking outside his home in central Fallujah, 40 miles west of Baghdad, according to police.

His assassination came a month after he agreed to take the dangerous job — the only person willing to do so — with promises to improve services and work with the Americans to ease traffic-clogging checkpoints in the city with a population of an estimated 150,000 to 200,000.

The 65-year-old Sunni sheik was the fourth city council chairman to be killed in some 14 months as insurgents target fellow Sunnis willing to cooperate with the U.S. and its Iraqi partners. Abdul-Amir's predecessor, Abbas Ali Hussein, who was shot to death on Feb. 2.

Both men were strong critics of al-Qaida in

Iraq, which is battling a growing number of Sunni tribes that have turned against it in the vast Anbar province — a center for anti-U.S. guerrillas since the uprising in Fallujah in 2004 that galvanized the insurgency.

U.S. officials say tribal leaders and even some other insurgents are increasingly repelled by the group's brutality and religious extremism. The tribes also are competing with al-Qaida for influence and control over diminishing territory in the face of U.S. assaults.

The U.S. military confirmed the killing, and provincial officials condemned it.

"He was one of the many good people of the province who worked to help the city of Fallujah rebuild and regain life," the provincial government said in a statement. "This murder was a crime against all of the citizens of Iraq. We again strongly condemn this cowardly back-stabbing act."

Fellow councilmen and neighbors said Abdul-Amir had run for the office before and ignored pleas from friends not to take the job.

Gunmen also broke into the home of Najim Abdullah Suod, the city council chief who preceded Hussein, killing the lawyer and his 23-year-old son on Sept. 24, 2006, while Sheik Kamal Nazal, a cleric, was gunned down as he walked to work on Feb. 7, 2006.

The attack occurred despite U.S. optimism about efforts to tame Anbar, a vast desert area that borders

Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as alliances have been struck with influential Sunni sheiks once arrayed against American-led forces.

At least 38 people were killed or found dead elsewhere in Iraq, including another top city official, the mayor of Mussayyib who died in a roadside bombing in the city about 40 miles south of Baghdad.

Three U.S. soldiers were killed and six were wounded Saturday in separate attacks in Baghdad and southwest of the capital, the military said.

A roadside bomb killed one U.S. soldier and wounded two while they were on a foot patrol southwest of Baghdad. Another died and three were wounded when their vehicle was struck by a roadside bomb, followed by small-arms fire in southwestern Baghdad, the military said. A combat security patrol also was attacked by small-arms fire, killing a soldier and wounding another in an eastern section of the capital.

A separate roadside bombing, in Diwaniyah about 80 miles south of the capital, killed a Polish soldier late Friday.

The U.S. military has said that the wall in Baghdad was meant to secure the minority Sunni community of Azamiyah, which "has been trapped in a spiral of sectarian violence and retaliation."

The area, located on the eastern side of the Tigris River, would be completely gated, with entrances and exits manned by Iraqi soldiers, according to the military.

A handout obtained by The Associated Press from a local official in Azamiyah who spoke on condition of anonymity because of security concerns but said he was given the handout by the U.S. military said the wall will be 12 feet high, about 2 feet thick and topped with coils of barbed wire. The military earlier said it would run three miles.

Some residents and local officials in the neighborhood complained that they had not been consulted in advance about the barrier.

"This will make the whole district a prison. This is collective punishment on the residents of Azamiyah," said Ahmed al-Dulaimi, a 41-year-old engineer who lives in the area. "They are going to punish all of us because of a few terrorists here and there."

The military insisted its aim was only to protect the area and this was one of many measures being undertaken as part of a U.S.-Iraqi security plan to pacify the capital, which began on Feb. 14.

"The intent is not to divide the city along sectarian lines," said Brig. Gen. John F. Campbell, the deputy commander of American forces in Baghdad.

"The intent is to provide a more secured neighborhood for people who live in selected neighborhoods. Some of the people who I've talked to have had favorable comments about it, and they want us to build some of them faster."

Campbell also said several more gated communities are being erected in the Iraqi capital. He did not provide specific examples but noted that some Baghdad markets also have been encircled by concrete barriers to a degree of success.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, meanwhile, prepared to begin an Arab tour on Sunday that will take him to Egypt, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Oman, his adviser Yassin Majid said.

Friday, April 20, 2007

The State of the Philippine Left --European Solidarity San Frontiers

The State of the Philippine Left

REYES Ric
26 May 2005

When asked to participate in this gathering, the Democratic Left Conference, I heartily agreed and requested that I be allowed to speak on the situation of the Philippine Left. The reason is that among the subjects to be discussed, it is the one that I feel I can contribute more and that allows me to share, not only my impressions of the common and diverse pictures of the community we call the Philippine Left, but ideas and suggestions regarding the pressing problems confronting it.

I am very happy to be here today and to see faces that have been familiar to me for decades, as well as new and younger leaders with whom I have worked with, and who have taken on leadership responsibilities during a very difficult period of the Philippine Left from the nineties to the present. Understandably, with the divisions and dynamics of the recent past remaining fresh to everyone, we came here with very modest aims and expectations. In fact, many of us came here prepared to take in doses of frustration, in case certain things don’t turn out well. But I have a feeling that everybody, or almost everybody, including me, yearns deeply, a sentiment that remains very strong among our constituents, for a more unifying process and results beyond our most recent effort, Alternatiba, or reinvigorating Alternatiba, whichever will strengthen the left more.

That is the reason why I would like to focus more on two issues, given time limitations. First, is to help gather all those resources to inspire hope in the unifying process, and second, how to set up all those processes that will bring us together again.

As we gather today, a deepening crisis of governance of the Philippine state confronts our society. The words “crisis of governance” were used in the late 80s by the CPP to describe a governmental crisis that opens up to the possibility of an extra-constitutional solution. When used in the Philippine context where state power is exclusively in the hands of ruling class factions or forces, except in the few marginal areas of open revolt, a crisis in governance will not in itself lead to a crisis of class rule, or something like a revolutionary situation, or a crisis that will lead to seizure of power by the popular classes and forces, a dual power situation, or a power sharing arrangement between elite factions and the popular forces.

EDSA II is a good example of a crisis of governance, which stops at the door of a crisis of class rule. The failed EDSA III shares the same limitations. EDSA I was deeper. The crisis that brought it about was both a crisis of governance and a crisis of class rule. The Marcos dictatorship was wracked not only by an intense inter-elite strife but more so by a nationwide revolutionary struggle led by the CPP, a seething Moro armed struggle in Muslim Mindanao, a CPP led though authentically indigenous armed movement in the Cordilleras, and an urban upsurge of the popular forces. On the agenda for hegemony at that time were not only the replacement of Marcos and his dictatorial rule, but a radical change of class-based power in favor of the popular classes.

What then is this crisis of governance that I’m referring to? We have to understand its causes.

First, a messy and fraud-ridden 2004 elections which created lasting credibility gaps for the Malacanang occupant, such as a majority proclamation by Congress instead of the usual unanimous proclamation and an electoral protest that will remain unresolved forever due to the death of the protestant. Second, an unprecedented fiscal crisis. Third, the devastating impact on the majority of people, and small and medium businesses, of liberalization measures on oil, power, water and prime commodities. Four, the exposes of gargantuan corruption at the highest levels of government, AFP corruption and conversion scandals, the Marcos wealth diversion, the coco levy scams, and now the grand jueteng protection money scandal which knocks at the door of the presidency. And fifth, the violence directed, with impunity, at journalists, lawyers and activists.

The over-all effect is ungovernability, a fearful sense of drift while the conditions of society and polity deteriorate, to which a section of the military and other right-wing forces offer a junta solution. What is new is that sections of business and the middle class no longer express alarm over this kind of fascist alternative. In fact a growing sentiment across classes for strongman types of leaders can be discerned from the respectable showing of Ping Lacson during the last presidential elections.

Many of the solutions prescribed by local elite leaders and US officials and government agencies consist of first, changes in the constitutional form of government. It is not because they want to strengthen mass participation in government; but because they fear a repetition of EDSA processes which may one day endanger the establishment itself. To them, the parliamentary solution is a way to solve the executive or presidential crisis, through the parliamentary vote of confidence or calling for early elections. It will rationalize governance by removing gridlocks or stalemates between the executive and legislative branches.

The second proposed solution is fiscal stabilization. However, fiscal stabilization, like other suggested solutions, will also produce more contradictions. Austerity measures, including major cuts in social service spending and government retrenchment are bound to fuel more unrest, just like VAT and other tax increases. The government does not have the political will to end automatic appropriation for debt service that takes up 40% of the national budget every year.

The half-hearted anti-corruption campaign cannot ease the crisis of governance but if followed to its logical conclusion, the axe may fall on Malacanang itself. A constitutional convention, although most desired, might become a fifth estate, recalling the 1971 experience, and a channel for agitation and accumulation of unrest. A move to call Congress as a constituent assembly will not be popular, because the masses have a low opinion of Congress. Adding fuel to the fire is the not-so secret agenda of people who want to change the Constitution, which is to water down the patrimony and social justice provisions of the existing Constitution, despite the mounting attacks on the people’s livelihood and dignity by neoliberal capitalist globalization.

I am not saying that these solutions will not work, but I believe the crisis might be prolonged and we should better prepare for it. The business of the Left, I believe, is to develop, within this crisis, those elements that might produce an intensification of the crisis of class rule. So if there are possibilities that open up, let us explore these in order to develop these into a bigger share of power, bigger space until the point of seizing state power.

There are two barriers or two problems that need to be solved, and these have come out before in our discourses. The first and new problem, which we have felt for some time now, is a kind of attitude we have observed among our people - a lack of interest in participating in movements for social change. Some call it cynicism; some call it an apolitical attitude; others believe the masses have not yet found the alternative that would inspire them to action. That is why it is very hard to produce a critical mass.

Second, a divided and in fact, in certain sections, a warring Left. It has been a heavy blow to the people’s morale and inspiration that the very people calling for social change are divided, fighting among themselves and in some instances, killing each other. This is an enormous problem and I believe we should put our heads together during our discourses in the days to come, and discover how to revive the hopes of the oppressed masses and the people, and how to get our act together, despite our differences.

I am more optimistic about the possibility that we will, once again, be together. In our past discussions and discourses, our commonalities and differences are becoming clearer. The important thing is how we can put this into practice. We are all engaged in theorizing and praxis, although I believe we are still wanting in both, and especially in relating and integrating theory and practice. For example, in what we call revisioning or reimagining of the socialist program for the past 13 years, a common position against the ravages of global capitalism is becoming clearer — the reaffirmation of the socialist principle of public ownership and public control. However, only a few groups have categorically and clearly stated that they stand for public control and public ownership, especially in key sectors of our economy.

It is natural that for a time we were engrossed in studying the failed attempts at building socialism, or independent governments that emphasized public control, and even our own experiences with government controlled and owned corporations. We used a lot of energy in clarifying nuances such as the role of private initiative and the role of private control in the macro-economy. I don’t believe we should regret this effort. I believe it was time well spent for we have deepened our understanding of capitalism, especially the state of capitalism in the Philippines.

To those who are still busy looking for a good role for private initiative, private component or private control, I can only suggest that they focus on the state of our markets. We must recognize that our country is on the margins of capitalism, and therefore its markets are highly distorted and imperfect, and the only solution to put more sense and public welfare into our economy is to reassert and reaffirm the need for public control and public ownership.

Another thing that we desperately need in the reconstruction of our socialist vision is the question of public accountability. What are the processes that will institute accountability — that will enable the public to participate in the administration of public enterprises and institutions? That is what we are striving to study, through theory and praxis in Akbayan and in political groups and people’s organizations that are part of Akbayan.

Our modest proposal is for participatory democracy and participatory socialism. We reaffirm the importance of public ownership and public control, and the importance as well of instituting a public accountability process in governing these institutions. I believe our unity is not far off; this is obvious from the discourses and practice of Freedom from Debt Coalition. I would like to thank the different blocs, groups and NGOS that patiently worked to strengthen this coalition because I believe it has a vital role and contribution, not only in the deepening of the socialist discourse and working for the interest of the worker and peasant masses, but also in the effort to develop a new Left culture.

Second, about the land question. There are some differences in the positions of various groups on land reform. We need a comradely type of discourse. The community to which I belong believes that we should use what we have won through law, principle, and constitutional mandate on agrarian reform. What is important is the creation of the potential to revive the fighting spirit of peasants and other rural folk, and from there discover what is better, ownership of small farms or more cooperative and collective agricultural production.

I think the discussion of the core issue should not end up in straitjacketing theory and practice. Instead we should grasp the dynamics opened up by victories in the anti-dictatorship and anti-feudal struggles during Marcos rule and Aquino’s total war. We should use the law to revive and organize the peasants’ militant spirit, so they can attain their land and organize themselves for their own welfare. It is very important to be able to share best experiences or best practices.

I can only offer some good examples from areas in many provinces where Unorka, Padayon, Parrds, and Peace operate. We do not believe that pushing a land to the tiller program, while forming independent peasant organizations in the countryside, can hinder their initiative to pursue more radical social changes and strengthen their political power. I respect and want to learn from other experiences, for example, experiences in Negros, where after getting land, the people went straight to collective management of an enterprise.

It is time to bury the traditional bias of socialist thinking against small farms; it has never been proved that these small farms have led to the revival of capitalism, whether it is in Russia, China or Vietnam. All researches have proved that land distribution does not contradict cooperation and mutual help in other aspects of production such as the collective purchase of inputs, tractors and other farm implements, and collective marketing of farm products. In fact, there are many good experiences from Russia, China and Vietnam that have been set aside in the course of debate.

The focus has been on studying new methods and initiatives that sometimes end up in World Bank market-led land reform programs. We have to review how farms and factories were managed, the valuable experiences of the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and Cuba, among others. I was privileged to meet comrades from other countries, and I was heartened and encouraged by the experiences they shared, past experiments that are better, more humane and more liberating, but were since buried by the sweeping condemnation of socialism.

About strategy, a strategy is made up of many elements but I will focus on one, the character of the Philippine state. The various efforts to further develop open and legal struggles are commendable. But in the more than one decade that we have participated in legal struggles, especially in the countryside and in urban areas that are hardly ever reached by media and institutions, we have come to some realizations.

Compared to many Latin American countries, the Philippine national state is very weak. Political power rests more on regional or provincial political elites and they exercise their power through their influence on local government; they exercise their power through their own state instruments like maintaining armed goons, influences on Churches, media and other institutions, and at the same time they also retain powerful clout in Malacanang and in Congress.

In the Philippines, a large part of state political power can be found in the localities. Although we consider as important the efforts of our comrades in the NGO community to explore various participatory processes, we cannot deny that the large part of state power is in the hands of regional and provincial elites. That limits the potential of national legal and open mass struggles to create radical changes in the country. In this light, it is very important to review the past.

The CPP-NPA-NDF was able to reach a level where it was able to establish alternative political power in different strategic areas in the countryside. In the desire to amass this strength and use it to seize power from the ruling elite faction, we were able to form tactical alliances with regional and local power elites. We were not able to review the implications of these actions. In a majority of these areas, we were not able to weaken this political power. So, when Marcos was kicked out and replaced by the Aquino faction, the reactionary character of the national state was easily reproduced. In this light, it is important to examine the experience of the Marxist-Leninist Party of the Philippines in its continuing efforts at base building. We should also examine the base building experience of our comrades in the RPM-ABB. And it would be good to study the experience in building the new types of zones of political power in the countryside by comrades in Padayon.

We should have an active dialogue because in developing a national strategy we should combine a national track, and at the same time, a provincial or regional power strategy. We must develop zones of people’s empowerment in the countryside that are similar in many respects, but are different from the traditional guerilla zones. We should deepen our study of the practice of the CPP (Reaffirm), despite its fundamental violation of the mass line, and its irresponsible and opportunist collaboration with landlords and the ruling elite. I have heard of areas where they have had good experiences on how to dismantle the political power of landlords. That is one of the bulwarks of the reproduction of state power and until we smash it, it will continue to play this role, despite “red” or radical EDSAs. Third, in relation to the dialectic of reform and revolution, which is often heard in my community, I believe we are wanting in this respect, because our practice has been more reform than revolution. It is clear to me that we should agree that the process of reform, however good, should always be set within the revolutionary framework.

There are still two past issues that weaken and eat at our unity - issues of our accountability. We have to make a direct, clear, critical and modest analysis of the anti-DPA campaign. I assure you that I will continue to help in this campaign, and even redouble my efforts. I suggest that comrades who were former members of the CPP should sit down and talk about this bravely and honestly. Let us exchange information. Let us reveal what we know. We should be able to differentiate between rumors and the truth. We have to level off on these things. Our people should be able to see that those who are fighting for social changes are capable of criticizing and correcting themselves. Our failure to do this will not help the re-strengthening of the revolutionary movement. But I have great faith and hope that we can do this. There were a lot of gibes aimed at Alternatiba in the past. But it was a real effort and it was able to develop a process and method.

I think, in the coming months, that we should seriously face the building of a socialist front. We should engage in active discourse and an analysis of ethics and rules. We can start by refraining from entering areas where other left forces already are, and by helping to solve any related problems. We should stop organizing the organized and start organizing the millions who are as yet unorganized. We should continue our dialogues. I have to admit that I have also failed to talk with some comrades these past years. The relations of some left groups with factions of the ruling elite are sometimes the source of jokes and intrigues. There is basis for honest and sincere criticism and critique, for we all know that these things were caused by the negative effects of the split and the actions of the CPP.

Some actions taken by comrades were simply ways to survive, ways of adjusting to the change in conditions. The period since the 1990s has been very difficult. Our belief in socialism and revolution was seriously shaken; comrades had no money; former party leaders were aging; still others had to face family and other problems. This was made worse by members of civil society factions who said the Left is this and that. We are only human. We suffered so much in this past decade and more. But we are here, still standing upright, despite problems or weaknesses we had and still have. In the end, the only thing we can do is to be kind to and patient with each other.



REYES Ric

Thursday, April 19, 2007

China in Africa: Lessons for the Philippines --Walden Bello(inquirer.net)

China in Africa: Lessons for the Philippines



By Walden Bello
INQUIRER.net
Last updated 02:19am (Mla time) 04/19/2007



MANILA, Philippines -- For many of our technocrats and economists, the salvation of the Philippine economy lies not only in ever increasing money remittances from our overseas workers but ever-tighter ties with China’s red-hot economy.

Perhaps a look at China’s presence in Africa might serve to temper their optimisms.

At the Seventh World Social Forum (WSF), held in Nairobi, Kenya, in late January, the most controversial topic was not HIV-AIDS, the US occupation of Iraq, or neoliberalism. It was China’s relations with Africa.

At a packed panel discussion organized by a semi-official Chinese NGO, the discussion was candid and angry. “First, Europe and America took over our big businesses. Now China is driving our small and medium-scale entrepreneurs to bankruptcy,” Humphrey Pole-Pole of the Tanzanian Social Forum told the Chinese speakers. “You don’t even contribute to employment, because you bring in your own labor.”

Stung by such remarks from the floor, Cui Jianjun, secretary general of the China NGO Network for International Exchanges, lost his diplomatic cool and launched into an emotional defense of Chinese foreign investment, saying, “We Chinese had to make the same hard decision on whether to accept foreign investment many, many years ago. You have to make the right decision or you will lose, lose, lose. You have to decide right, or you will remain poor, poor, poor.”

The vigorous exchange should have been anticipated, since many Africans view China as having the potential of bringing either great promise or great harm. If African civil society representatives were hard on China, this was because they desperately wanted China to reverse course before it was too late, so that it would avoid the path trod by Europe and the United States.

Beijing’s high profile in Africa

The debate at the WSF took place amid a marked elevation of Africa’s profile in China’s foreign policy. In early February, President Hu Jintao made his third trip to Africa in three years, following the success of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which took place Nov. 4-5, 2006. Attended by 48 African delegations, most of them led by heads of state, the event was the largest international summit held in Beijing.

At the start of the summit, Beijing unveiled a glittering trade and aid plan designed to cement its “strategic partnership” with Africa. The key items in the package committed China to doubling its 2006 assistance in three years, providing $3 billion worth of preferential loans and $2 billion worth of export credits, and canceling all interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 2005 and were owed by the heavily indebted and poorest African countries. In addition, the two sides agreed to raise the volume of trade from $40 billion in 2005 to $100 billion by 2010 and set up of a China-Africa Development Fund that would be capitalized to the tune of $5 billion to support Chinese companies investing in Africa.

If not yet the biggest external player in Africa, China is certainly the most dynamic. It now accounts for 60 percent of oil exports from Sudan and 35 percent of those from Angola. Chinese firms mine copper in Zambia and Congo-Brazzaville, cobalt in the Congo, gold in South Africa, and uranium in Zimbabwe. Its ecological footprint is large, says Michelle Chan-Fishel of Friends of the Earth International, consuming as it does 46 percent of Gabon’s forest exports, 60 percent of timber exported from Equatorial Guinea, and 11 percent of timber exports from Cameroon.

Contrasting images of China

China is popular with African governments. “There is something refreshing to China’s approach,” said a Nigerian diplomat who asked not to be identified. “They don’t attach all those conditionalities that accompany Western loans.” Adds Justin Fong, executive director of the Chinese NGO, Moving Mountains: “Whether accurate or not, the image Africans have of the Chinese is that they get things done. They don’t waste their time in meetings. They just go ahead and build roads.”

An African development specialist working with a western aid organization claimed that Chinese projects are low cost affairs compared to western projects. “Labor costs are low, they integrate African labor, so some transfer of skills takes place, and the Chinese workers live in the village, and this means living like the villagers, down to competing with them for dog meat.”

While they might dispute this characterization of China’s impact, most NGOs are nuanced in their assessments. They acknowledge that China has a different trajectory in Africa than Europe and the United States. Whereas the West began by exploiting Africa, China initiated its relations with Africa with “people-to-people” medical and technical assistance missions in the 1960s and 1970s, the most famous of which was the building of the now fabled Tanzania-Zambia (Tanzam) Railway. But with China’s rise as a modernizing economic superpower after the definitive decision in 1984 to use capitalism as the engine of growth, the old solidarity rationale has been replaced by a dangerously single-minded pursuit of economic interests -- in this case, mainly oil and mineral resources to feed a red-hot economy.

If African governments were accountable to their people, say NGO critics, Chinese aid could play a very positive role, especially if compared with World Bank and International Monetary Fund loans that come with conditions to bring down tariffs, loosen government regulation, and privatize state enterprises. But with non-accountable, non-transparent governments, such as those in the Sudan and Zimbabwe, say the critics, Chinese loan and aid programs contribute instead to consolidating the rule of non-democratic elites.

Crossing the line in Sudan

Where China has definitely crossed the line is in Sudan. Using its veto power at the UN Security Council, China has prevented the international community from creating and deploying a multinational force to protect people in Darfur who are being killed or raped by militias backed by the Sudanese government. Even one African diplomat sympathetic to China asserts, “China’s strong backing for the Sudanese government has discouraged African governments that are trying to push it to accept an African Union solution to the problem.”

China has very substantial interests in Sudan. These are set out in detail in an important collection of studies launched at the WSF titled, "African Perspectives on China in Africa," edited by Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks. China obtained oil exploration and production rights in 1995 when the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) bought a 40-percent stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Co., which is pumping over 300,000 barrels per day. Sinopec, another Chinese firm, is building a 1,500-kilometer pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, where China’s Petroleum Engineering Construction Co. is constructing a tanker terminal . Author John Rocha estimates Chinese investment in oil exploration to reach $8 billion.

Chinese interests go beyond oil. Its investment in textile mills is estimated at $100 million. It has emerged as one of Sudan’s top arms suppliers. In one particular barter arrangement, China supplied $400 million worth of weapons in return for cotton. It is active in infrastructure, with its firms building bridges near the Merowe Dam and two other sites on the River Nile. It is involved in key hydropower projects, the most controversial being the Merowe Dam, which is expected to ultimately cost $1.8 billion.

The construction of the Merowe Dam has involved forced resettlement of the Hambdan people living at or near the site and repression and an armed attack on the Amri people who have been organizing to prevent the Sudanese government’s plan to transfer them to the desert. Local police and private agencies now provide 24-hour security to Chinese engineering detachments, but civil society observers say the aim of these groups is less protection of the Chinese than repression of growing opposition.

As Ali Askari, director of the London-based Piankhi Research Group, puts it, “The sad truth is, both the Chinese and their elite partners in the Sudan government want to conceal some terrible facts about their partnership. They are joining hands to uproot poor people, expropriate their land, and appropriate their natural resources.”

Chinese and Sudanese officials tend to dismiss such criticism as the machinations of western powers. Such powers are alarmed at China’s becoming the top international player in a country long treated as being in the West’s sphere of influence. But, according to Beijing and Khartoum, theWest’s dismal record of colonial plunder deprives its statements of any moral authority.

Defending its close relations with the Sudanese government, a Chinese foreign ministry official, Zhai Jun, noted the contrast in African governments’ reception of China and the West: “Some people believe that by ‘taking’ resources and energy from Africa, China is looting Africa...If this was so, then African countries would express their dissatisfaction...they would approach China, as they did...countries that exploited the continent in the past.”

However, Chinese officials are wrong to think that African NGOs are merely parroting the rhetoric of self-interested western governments. In fact, civil society groups also consider such western criticism hypocritical. Commenting on the remark of a World Bank official to the effect that “Chinese handouts without reforms” would not be beneficial to Africa, John Karumbidza, a contributor to the "China in Africa" volume, acidly remarks, “It is the case ... that this same bank and Western approach over the past half century has failed to deliver development, and left Africa in more debt than when they began.”

Other problematic partnerships

These criticisms are unlikely to go away, not only in Sudan but also in many other countries where Chinese involvement with controversial regimes runs deep. With relations with the West and even South Africa deteriorating over his political record, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has increasingly turned to China, which one of his key ministers has characterized as an “all-weather friend.” Chinese investment in mining, energy, telecommunications, agriculture, and other sectors was estimated at $600 million at the end of 2004, with another $600 million pledged in June 2005. The price, however, has been high, according to critics, who claim that Mugabe’s government has handed de facto control of key strategic industries to the Chinese. A contract with China to farm 386 square miles of land while millions of Zimbabweans remain landless has come under fire, with rural sociologist John Karumbidza blasting it as “nothing more than land renting and typical agro-business relations that turn the land holders and their workers into labor tenants and subject them to exploitation.”

The Nigerian government is another problematic Chinese partner, according to civil society activists. China has extensive interests in Nigeria, particularly in oil exploration and production. The China National Offshore Corporation (CNOOC), notes researcher John Rocha, has acquired a 45-percent working interest in an offshore enterprise, OML 130, for $2.3 billion; the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has invested in the Port Harcourt refinery; and a joint venture between the Chinese Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and the L.N. Mittal Group, plans to invest $6 billion in railways, oil refining, and power in exchange for rights to drill oil.

These interests have led to an increasingly tight alliance with the faction of the ruling People’s Democratic Party dominated by President Olusegun Obasanjo. This relationship has a controversial security dimension. As Ndubisi Obiorah, another contributor to the "China in Africa" volume, who is director of the Center for Law and Social Action in Lagos, notes: “The Nigerian government is increasingly turning to China for weapons to deal with the worsening insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta. The Nigerian Air Force purchased 14 Chinese-made versions of the upgraded MiG 21 jet fighter; the navy has ordered patrol boats to secure the swamps and creeks of the Niger Delta.” Not surprisingly, the rebel Movement for the Emancipation of the Nigerian Delta (MEND) has warned Chinese companies to keep out of the region or risk attack.

With their integrated political, military, economic, and diplomatic components, China’s “strategic partnerships” with governments such as those of Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe increasingly have the feel of the old US and Soviet relationships with client states during the Cold War.

Will civil society make the difference?

Nevertheless, many civil society activists do not discount the possibility that things may yet be turned around. Though critical of current Chinese policies, Humphrey Pole-Pole of Tanzania appealed at the Nairobi meeting for a “win-win-win” strategy -- that is, “a win for China, a win for African governments, and a win for African people. This is not impossible.”

The key to such a change may be the growth of Chinese civil society organizations, some of which are increasingly independent of and indeed critical of government policies within China.

But closer ties between Chinese and African NGOs are not enough, says Justin Fong. Mechanisms to ensure Chinese government accountability are needed. One point of vulnerability he identifies is the practice of Chinese government entities, such as the China Export-Import Bank, of going for co-financing for their Africa projects to international banks such as HSBC and Citigroup. When it comes to controversial projects, pressure might be indirectly placed on the Chinese by lobbying these institutions, which are more sensitive about their image than Beijing. Such tactics, which sometimes worked with western governments and firms, may not, however, succeed with China.

But whatever their differences, civil society activists, African and Chinese, agree on one thing. It will be a hard, uphill struggle to change the Chinese juggernaut’s direction in Africa.

Walden Bello is professor of sociology at the University of the Philippines and executive director of the Bangkok-based research and advocacy institute Focus on the Global South.



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Wednesday, April 11, 2007

Bush's Shadow Army by Jeremy Scahill (The Nation)

Bush's Shadow Army by Jeremy Scahill (The Nation)



Bush's Shadow Army

Jeremy Scahill




Jeremy Scahill reports on the Bush Administration's growing dependence on private security forces such as Blackwater USA and efforts in Congress to rein them in. This article is adapted from his new book, Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army (Nation Books).

On September 10, 2001, before most Americans had heard of Al Qaeda or imagined the possibility of a "war on terror," Donald Rumsfeld stepped to the podium at the Pentagon to deliver one of his first major addresses as Defense Secretary under President George W. Bush. Standing before the former corporate executives he had tapped as his top deputies overseeing the high-stakes business of military contracting--many of them from firms like Enron, General Dynamics and Aerospace Corporation--Rumsfeld issued a declaration of war.

"The topic today is an adversary that poses a threat, a serious threat, to the security of the United States of America," Rumsfeld thundered. "It disrupts the defense of the United States and places the lives of men and women in uniform at risk." He told his new staff, "You may think I'm describing one of the last decrepit dictators of the world.... [But] the adversary's closer to home," he said. "It's the Pentagon bureaucracy." Rumsfeld called for a wholesale shift in the running of the Pentagon, supplanting the old DoD bureaucracy with a new model, one based on the private sector. Announcing this major overhaul, Rumsfeld told his audience, "I have no desire to attack the Pentagon; I want to liberate it. We need to save it from itself."

The next morning, the Pentagon would be attacked, literally, as a Boeing 757--American Airlines Flight 77--smashed into its western wall. Rumsfeld would famously assist rescue workers in pulling bodies from the rubble. But it didn't take long for Rumsfeld to seize the almost unthinkable opportunity presented by 9/11 to put his personal war--laid out just a day before--on the fast track. The new Pentagon policy would emphasize covert actions, sophisticated weapons systems and greater reliance on private contractors. It became known as the Rumsfeld Doctrine. "We must promote a more entrepreneurial approach: one that encourages people to be proactive, not reactive, and to behave less like bureaucrats and more like venture capitalists," Rumsfeld wrote in the summer of 2002 in an article for Foreign Affairs titled "Transforming the Military."

Although Rumsfeld was later thrown overboard by the Administration in an attempt to placate critics of the Iraq War, his military revolution was here to stay. Bidding farewell to Rumsfeld in November 2006, Bush credited him with overseeing the "most sweeping transformation of America's global force posture since the end of World War II." Indeed, Rumsfeld's trademark "small footprint" approach ushered in one of the most significant developments in modern warfare--the widespread use of private contractors in every aspect of war, including in combat.

The often overlooked subplot of the wars of the post-9/11 period is their unprecedented scale of outsourcing and privatization. From the moment the US troop buildup began in advance of the invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon made private contractors an integral part of the operations. Even as the government gave the public appearance of attempting diplomacy, Halliburton was prepping for a massive operation. When US tanks rolled into Baghdad in March 2003, they brought with them the largest army of private contractors ever deployed in modern war. By the end of Rumsfeld's tenure in late 2006, there were an estimated 100,000 private contractors on the ground in Iraq--an almost one-to-one ratio with active-duty American soldiers.

To the great satisfaction of the war industry, before Rumsfeld resigned he took the extraordinary step of classifying private contractors as an official part of the US war machine. In the Pentagon's 2006 Quadrennial Review, Rumsfeld outlined what he called a "road map for change" at the DoD, which he said had begun to be implemented in 2001. It defined the "Department's Total Force" as "its active and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its contractors--constitut[ing] its warfighting capability and capacity. Members of the Total Force serve in thousands of locations around the world, performing a vast array of duties to accomplish critical missions." This formal designation represented a major triumph for war contractors--conferring on them a legitimacy they had never before enjoyed.

Contractors have provided the Bush Administration with political cover, allowing the government to deploy private forces in a war zone free of public scrutiny, with the deaths, injuries and crimes of those forces shrouded in secrecy. The Administration and the GOP-controlled Congress in turn have shielded the contractors from accountability, oversight and legal constraints. Despite the presence of more than 100,000 private contractors on the ground in Iraq, only one has been indicted for crimes or violations. "We have over 200,000 troops in Iraq and half of them aren't being counted, and the danger is that there's zero accountability," says Democrat Dennis Kucinich, one of the leading Congressional critics of war contracting.

While the past years of Republican monopoly on government have marked a golden era for the industry, those days appear to be ending. Just a month into the new Congressional term, leading Democrats were announcing investigations of runaway war contractors. Representative John Murtha, chair of the Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, after returning from a trip to Iraq in late January, said, "We're going to have extensive hearings to find out exactly what's going on with contractors. They don't have a clear mission and they're falling all over each other." Two days later, during confirmation hearings for Gen. George Casey as Army chief of staff, Senator Jim Webb declared, "This is a rent-an-army out there." Webb asked Casey, "Wouldn't it be better for this country if those tasks, particularly the quasi-military gunfighting tasks, were being performed by active-duty military soldiers in terms of cost and accountability?" Casey defended the contracting system but said armed contractors "are the ones that we have to watch very carefully." Senator Joe Biden, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, has also indicated he will hold hearings on contractors. Parallel to the ongoing investigations, there are several bills gaining steam in Congress aimed at contractor oversight.

Occupying the hot seat through these deliberations is the shadowy mercenary company Blackwater USA. Unbeknownst to many Americans and largely off the Congressional radar, Blackwater has secured a position of remarkable power and protection within the US war apparatus. This company's success represents the realization of the life's work of the conservative officials who formed the core of the Bush Administration's war team, for whom radical privatization has long been a cherished ideological mission. Blackwater has repeatedly cited Rumsfeld's statement that contractors are part of the "Total Force" as evidence that it is a legitimate part of the nation's "warfighting capability and capacity." Invoking Rumsfeld's designation, the company has in effect declared its forces above the law--entitled to the immunity from civilian lawsuits enjoyed by the military, but also not bound by the military's court martial system. While the initial inquiries into Blackwater have focused on the complex labyrinth of secretive subcontracts under which it operates in Iraq, a thorough investigation into the company reveals a frightening picture of a politically connected private army that has become the Bush Administration's Praetorian Guard.




Blackwater Rising


Blackwater was founded in 1996 by conservative Christian multimillionaire and ex-Navy SEAL Erik Prince--the scion of a wealthy Michigan family whose generous political donations helped fuel the rise of the religious right and the Republican revolution of 1994. At its founding, the company largely consisted of Prince's private fortune and a vast 5,000-acre plot of land located near the Great Dismal Swamp in Moyock, North Carolina. Its vision was "to fulfill the anticipated demand for government outsourcing of firearms and related security training." In the following years, Prince, his family and his political allies poured money into Republican campaign coffers, supporting the party's takeover of Congress and the ascension of George W. Bush to the presidency.

While Blackwater won government contracts during the Clinton era, which was friendly to privatization, it was not until the "war on terror" that the company's glory moment arrived. Almost overnight, following September 11, the company would become a central player in a global war. "I've been operating in the training business now for four years and was starting to get a little cynical on how seriously people took security," Prince told Fox News host Bill O'Reilly shortly after 9/11. "The phone is ringing off the hook now."

Among those calls was one from the CIA, which contracted Blackwater to work in Afghanistan in the early stages of US operations there. In the ensuing years the company has become one of the greatest beneficiaries of the "war on terror," winning nearly $1 billion in noncovert government contracts, many of them no-bid arrangements. In just a decade Prince has expanded the Moyock headquarters to 7,000 acres, making it the world's largest private military base. Blackwater currently has 2,300 personnel deployed in nine countries, with 20,000 other contractors at the ready. It has a fleet of more than twenty aircraft, including helicopter gunships and a private intelligence division, and it is manufacturing surveillance blimps and target systems.

In 2005 after Hurricane Katrina its forces deployed in New Orleans, where it billed the federal government $950 per man, per day--at one point raking in more than $240,000 a day. At its peak the company had about 600 contractors deployed from Texas to Mississippi. Since Katrina, it has aggressively pursued domestic contracting, opening a new domestic operations division. Blackwater is marketing its products and services to the Department of Homeland Security, and its representatives have met with California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. The company has applied for operating licenses in all US coastal states. Blackwater is also expanding its physical presence inside US borders, opening facilities in Illinois and California.

Its largest obtainable government contract is with the State Department, for providing security to US diplomats and facilities in Iraq. That contract began in 2003 with the company's $21 million no-bid deal to protect Iraq proconsul Paul Bremer. Blackwater has guarded the two subsequent US ambassadors, John Negroponte and Zalmay Khalilzad, as well as other diplomats and occupation offices. Its forces have protected more than ninety Congressional delegations in Iraq, including that of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. According to the latest government contract records, since June 2004 Blackwater has been awarded $750 million in State Department contracts alone. It is currently engaged in an intensive lobbying campaign to be sent into Darfur as a privatized peacekeeping force. Last October President Bush lifted some sanctions on Christian southern Sudan, paving the way for a potential Blackwater training mission there. In January the Washington, DC, representative for southern Sudan's regional government said he expected Blackwater to begin training the south's security forces soon.

Since 9/11 Blackwater has hired some well-connected officials close to the Bush Administration as senior executives. Among them are J. Cofer Black, former head of counterterrorism at the CIA and the man who led the hunt for Osama bin Laden after 9/11, and Joseph Schmitz, former Pentagon Inspector General, who was responsible for policing contractors like Blackwater during much of the "war on terror"--something he stood accused of not doing effectively. By the end of Schmitz's tenure, powerful Republican Senator Charles Grassley launched a Congressional probe into whether Schmitz had "quashed or redirected two ongoing criminal investigations" of senior Bush Administration officials. Under bipartisan fire, Schmitz resigned and signed up with Blackwater.

Despite its central role, Blackwater had largely operated in the shadows until March 31, 2004, when four of its private soldiers in Iraq were ambushed and killed in Falluja. A mob then burned the bodies and dragged them through the streets, stringing up two from a bridge over the Euphrates. In many ways it was the moment the Iraq War turned. US forces laid siege to Falluja days later, killing hundreds of people and displacing thousands, inflaming the fierce Iraqi resistance that haunts occupation forces to this day. For most Americans, it was the first they had heard of private soldiers. "People began to figure out this is quite a phenomenon," says Representative David Price, a North Carolina Democrat, who said he began monitoring the use of private contractors after Falluja. "I'm probably like most Congress members in kind of coming to this awareness and developing an interest in it" after the incident.

What is not so well-known is that in Washington after Falluja, Blackwater executives kicked into high gear, capitalizing on the company's newfound recognition. The day after the ambush, it hired the Alexander Strategy Group, a K Street lobbying firm run by former senior staffers of then-majority leader Tom DeLay before the firm's meltdown in the wake of the Jack Abramoff scandal. A week to the day after the ambush, Erik Prince was sitting down with at least four senior members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, including its chair, John Warner. Senator Rick Santorum arranged the meeting, which included Warner and two other key Republican senators--Appropriations Committee chair Ted Stevens of Alaska and George Allen of Virginia. This meeting followed an earlier series of face-to-faces Prince had had with powerful House Republicans who oversaw military contracts. Among them: DeLay; Porter Goss, chair of the House Intelligence Committee (and future CIA director); Duncan Hunter, chair of the House Armed Services Committee; and Representative Bill Young, chair of the House Appropriations Committee. What was discussed at these meetings remains a secret. But Blackwater was clearly positioning itself to make the most of its new fame. Indeed, two months later, Blackwater was handed one of the government's most valuable international security contracts, worth more than $300 million.




http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070402/scahill/3


The firm was also eager to stake out a role in crafting the rules that would govern mercenaries under US contract. "Because of the public events of March 31, [Blackwater's] visibility and need to communicate a consistent message has elevated here in Washington," said Blackwater's new lobbyist Chris Bertelli. "There are now several federal regulations that apply to their activities, but they are generally broad in nature. One thing that's lacking is an industry standard. That's something we definitely want to be engaged in." By May Blackwater was leading a lobbying effort by the private military industry to try to block Congressional or Pentagon efforts to place their forces under the military court martial system.

But while Blackwater enjoyed its new status as a hero in the "war on terror" within the Administration and the GOP-controlled Congress, the families of the four men killed at Falluja say they were being stonewalled by Blackwater as they attempted to understand the circumstances of how their loved ones were killed. After what they allege was months of effort to get straight answers from the company, the families filed a ground-breaking wrongful death lawsuit against Blackwater in January 2005, accusing the company of not providing the men with what they say were contractually guaranteed safeguards. Among the allegations: The company sent them on the Falluja mission that day short two men, with less powerful weapons than they should have had and in Pajero jeeps instead of armored vehicles. This case could have far-reaching reverberations and is being monitored closely by the war-contractor industry--former Halliburton subsidiary KBR has even filed an amicus brief supporting Blackwater. If the lawsuit is successful, it could pave the way for a tobacco litigation-type scenario, where war contractors find themselves besieged by legal claims of workers killed or injured in war zones.

As the case has made its way through the court system, Blackwater has enlisted powerhouse Republican lawyers to defend it, among them Fred Fielding, who was recently named by Bush as White House counsel, replacing Harriet Miers; and Kenneth Starr, former Whitewater prosecutor investigating President Clinton, and the company's current counsel of record. Blackwater has not formally debated the specific allegations in the suit, but what has emerged in its court filings is a series of legal arguments intended to bolster Blackwater's contention that it is essentially above the law. Blackwater claims that if US courts allow the company to be sued for wrongful death, that could threaten the nation's war-fighting capacity: "Nothing could be more destructive of the all-volunteer, Total Force concept underlying U.S. military manpower doctrine than to expose the private components to the tort liability systems of fifty states, transported overseas to foreign battlefields," the company argued in legal papers. In February Blackwater suffered a major defeat when the Supreme Court declined its appeal to hear the Falluja case, paving the way for the state trial--where there would be no cap on damages a jury could award--to proceed.

Congress is beginning to take an interest in this potentially groundbreaking case. On February 7 Representative Henry Waxman chaired hearings of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee. While the hearings were billed as looking at US reliance on military contractors, they largely focused on Blackwater and the Falluja incident. For the first time, Blackwater was forced to share a venue with the families of the men killed at Falluja. "Private contractors like Blackwater work outside the scope of the military's chain of command and can literally do whatever they please without any liability or accountability from the US government," Katy Helvenston, whose son Scott was one of the Blackwater contractors killed, told the committee. "Therefore, Blackwater can continue accepting hundreds of millions of dollars in taxpayer money from the government without having to answer a single question about its security operators."

Citing the pending litigation, Blackwater's general counsel, Andrew Howell, declined to respond to many of the charges levied against his company by the families and asked several times for the committee to go into closed session. "The men who went on the mission on March 31, each had their weapons and they had sufficient ammunition," Howell told the committee, adding that the men were in "appropriate" vehicles. That was sharply disputed by the men's families, who allege that in order to save $1.5 million Blackwater did not provide the four with armored vehicles. "Once the men signed on with Blackwater and were flown to the Middle East, Blackwater treated them as fungible commodities," Helvenston told lawmakers in her emotional testimony, delivered on behalf of all four families.

The issue that put this case on Waxman's radar was the labyrinth of subcontracts underpinning the Falluja mission. Since November 2004 Waxman has been trying to pin down who the Blackwater men were ultimately working for the day of the ambush. "For over eighteen months, the Defense Department wouldn't even respond to my inquiry," says Waxman. "When it finally replied last July, it didn't even supply the breakdown I requested. In fact, it denied that private security contractors did any work at all under the [Pentagon's contracting program]. We now know that isn't true." Waxman's struggle to follow the money on this one contract involving powerful war contractors like KBR provides a graphic illustration of the secretive nature of the whole war contracting industry.

What is not in dispute regarding the Falluja incident is that Blackwater was working with a Kuwaiti business called Regency under a contract with the world's largest food services company, Eurest Support Services. ESS is a subcontractor for KBR and another giant war contractor, Fluor, in Iraq under the Pentagon's LOGCAP contracting program. One contract covering Blackwater's Falluja mission indicated the mission was ultimately a subcontract with KBR. Last summer KBR denied this. Then ESS wrote Waxman to say the mission was conducted under Fluor's contract with ESS. Fluor denied that, and the Pentagon told Waxman it didn't know which company the mission was ultimately linked to. Waxman alleged that Blackwater and the other subcontractors were "adding significant markups" to their subcontracts for the same security services that Waxman believes were then charged to US taxpayers. "It's remarkable that the world of contractors and subcontractors is so murky that we can't even get to the bottom of this, let alone calculate how many millions of dollars taxpayers lose in each step of the subcontracting process," says Waxman.

While it appeared for much of the February 7 hearing that the contract's provenance would remain obscure, that changed when, at the end of the hearing, the Pentagon revealed that the original contractor was, in fact, KBR. In violation of military policy against LOGCAP contractors' using private forces for security instead of US troops, KBR had entered into a subcontract with ESS that was protected by Blackwater; those costs were allegedly passed on to US taxpayers to the tune of $19.6 million. Blackwater said it billed ESS $2.3 million for its services, meaning a markup of more than $17 million was ultimately passed on to the government. Three weeks after the hearing, KBR told shareholders it may be forced to repay up to $400 million to the government as a result of an ongoing Army investigation.

It took more than two years for Waxman to get an answer to a simple question: Whom were US taxpayers paying for services? But, as the Falluja lawsuit shows, it is not just money at issue. It is human life.




A Killing on Christmas Eve


While much of the publicity Blackwater has received stems from Falluja, another, more recent incident is attracting new scrutiny. On Christmas Eve inside Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone, an American Blackwater contractor allegedly shot and killed an Iraqi bodyguard protecting a senior Iraqi official. For weeks after the shooting, unconfirmed reports circulated around the Internet that alcohol may have been involved and that the Iraqi was shot ten times in the chest. The story then went that the contractor was spirited out of Iraq before he could be prosecuted. Media inquiries got nowhere--the US Embassy refused to confirm that it was a Blackwater contractor, and the company refused to comment.

Then the incident came up at the February 7 Congressional hearing. As the session was drawing to a close, Representative Kucinich raced back into the room with what he said was a final question. He entered a news report on the incident into the record and asked Blackwater counsel Howell if Blackwater had flown the contractor out of Iraq after the alleged shooting. "That gentleman, on the day the incident occurred, he was off duty," Howell said, in what was the first official confirmation of the incident from Blackwater. "Blackwater did bring him back to the United States."

"Is he going to be extradited back to Iraq for murder, and if not, why not?" Kucinich asked.

"Sir, I am not law enforcement. All I can say is that there's currently an investigation," Howell replied. "We are fully cooperating and supporting that investigation."

Kucinich then said, "I just want to point out that there's a question that could actually make [Blackwater's] corporate officers accessories here in helping to create a flight from justice for someone who's committed a murder."



The War on the Hill

Several bills are now making their way through Congress aimed at oversight and transparency of the private forces that have emerged as major players in the wars of the post-9/11 period. In mid-February Senators Byron Dorgan, Patrick Leahy and John Kerry introduced legislation aimed at cracking down on no-bid contracts and cronyism, providing for penalties of up to twenty years in prison and fines of up to $1 million for what they called "war profiteering." It is part of what Democrats describe as a multi-pronged approach. "I think there's a critical mass of us now who are working on it," says Congressman Price, who represents Blackwater's home state. In January Price introduced legislation that would expand the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA) to include all contractors in a war zone, not just those working for or alongside the armed forces. Most of Blackwater's work in Iraq, for instance, is contracted by the State Department. Price indicated that the alleged Christmas Eve shooting could be a test case of sorts under his legislation. "I will be following this and I'll be calling for a full investigation," he said.

But there's at least one reason to be wary of this approach: Price's office consulted with the private military lobby as it crafted the legislation, which has the industry's strong endorsement. Perhaps that's because MEJA has been for the most part unenforced. "Even in situations when US civilian law could potentially have been applied to contractor crimes, it wasn't," observed P.W. Singer, a leading scholar on contractors. American prosecutors are already strapped for resources in their home districts--how could they be expected to conduct complex investigations in Iraq? Who will protect the investigators and prosecutors? How will they interview Iraqi victims? How could they effectively oversee 100,000 individuals spread across a dangerous war zone? "It's a good question," concedes Price. "I'm not saying that it would be a simple matter." He argues his legislation is an attempt to "put the whole contracting enterprise on a new accountable footing."

This past fall, taking a different tack--much to the dismay of the industry--Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, an Air Force reserve lawyer and former reserve judge, quietly inserted language into the 2007 Defense Authorization, which Bush signed into law, that places contractors under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), commonly known as the court martial system. Graham implemented the change with no public debate and with almost no awareness among the broader Congress, but war contractors immediately questioned its constitutionality. Indeed, this could be a rare moment when mercenaries and civil libertarians are on the same side. Many contractors are not armed combatants; they work in food, laundry and other support services. While the argument could be made that armed contractors like those working for Blackwater should be placed under the UCMJ, Graham's change could result in a dishwasher from Nepal working for KBR being prosecuted like a US soldier. On top of all this, the military has enough trouble policing its own massive force and could scarcely be expected to monitor an additional 100,000 private personnel. Besides, many contractors in Iraq are there under the auspices of the State Department and other civilian agencies, not the military.

In an attempt to clarify these matters, Senator Barack Obama introduced comprehensive new legislation in February. It requires clear rules of engagement for armed contractors, expands MEJA and provides for the DoD to "arrest and detain" contractors suspected of crimes and then turn them over to civilian authorities for prosecution. It also requires the Justice Department to submit a comprehensive report on current investigations of contractor abuses, the number of complaints received about contractors and criminal cases opened. In a statement to The Nation, Obama said contractors are "operating with unclear lines of authority, out-of-control costs and virtually no oversight by Congress. This black hole of accountability increases the danger to our troops and American civilians serving as contractors." He said his legislation would "re-establish control over these companies," while "bringing contractors under the rule of law."

Democratic Representative Jan Schakowsky, a member of the House intelligence committee, has been a leading critic of the war contracting system. Her Iraq and Afghanistan Contractor Sunshine Act, introduced in February, which bolsters Obama's, boils down to what Schakowsky sees as a long overdue fact-finding mission through the secretive contracting bureaucracy. Among other provisions, it requires the government to determine and make public the number of contractors and subcontractors (at any tier) that are employed in Iraq and Afghanistan; any host country's, international or US laws that have been broken by contractors; disciplinary actions taken against contractors; and the total number of dead and wounded contractors. Schakowsky says she has tried repeatedly over the past several years to get this information and has been stonewalled or ignored. "We're talking about billions and billions of dollars--some have estimated forty cents of every dollar [spent on the occupation] goes to these contractors, and we couldn't get any information on casualties, on deaths," says Schakowsky. "It has been virtually impossible to shine the light on this aspect of the war and so when we discuss the war, its scope, its costs, its risks, they have not been part of this whatsoever. This whole shadow force that's been operating in Iraq, we know almost nothing about. I think it keeps at arm's length from the American people what this war is all about."

While not by any means a comprehensive total of the number of contractor casualties, 770 contractor deaths and 7,761 injured in Iraq as of December 31, 2006, were confirmed by the Labor Department. But that only counts those contractors whose families applied for benefits under the government's Defense Base Act insurance. Independent analysts say the number is likely much higher. Blackwater alone has lost at least twenty-seven men in Iraq. And then there's the financial cost: Almost $4 billion in taxpayer funds have been paid for private security forces in Iraq, according to Waxman. Yet even with all these additional forces, the military is struggling to meet the demands of a White House bent on military adventurism.

A week after Donald Rumsfeld's rule at the Pentagon ended, US forces had been stretched so thin by the "war on terror" that former Secretary of State Colin Powell declared "the active Army is about broken." Rather than rethinking its foreign policies, the Administration forged ahead with plans for a troop "surge" in Iraq, and Bush floated a plan to supplement the military with a Civilian Reserve Corps in his January State of the Union address. "Such a corps would function much like our military Reserve. It would ease the burden on the armed forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them," Bush said. The President, it seemed, was just giving a fancy new title to something the Administration has already done with its "revolution" in military affairs and unprecedented reliance on contractors. Yet while Bush's proposed surge has sparked a fierce debate in Congress and among the public, the Administration's increasing reliance on private military contractors has gone largely undebated and underreported.

"The increasing use of contractors, private forces or as some would say 'mercenaries' makes wars easier to begin and to fight--it just takes money and not the citizenry," says Michael Ratner, president of the Center for Constitutional Rights, which has sued contractors for alleged abuses in Iraq. "To the extent a population is called upon to go to war, there is resistance, a necessary resistance to prevent wars of self-aggrandizement, foolish wars and in the case of the United States, hegemonic imperialist wars. Private forces are almost a necessity for a United States bent on retaining its declining empire."

With talk of a Civilian Reserve Corps and Blackwater promoting the idea of a privatized "contractor brigade" to work with the military, war critics in Congress are homing in on what they see as a sustained, undeclared escalation through the use of private forces. "'Surge' implies a bump that has a beginning and an end," says Schakowsky. "Having a third or a quarter of [the forces] present on the ground not even part of the debate is a very dangerous thing in our democracy, because war is the most critical thing that we do."

Indeed, contractor deaths are not counted in the total US death count, and their crimes and violations go undocumented and unpunished, further masking the true costs of the war. "When you're bringing in contractors whom the law doesn't apply to, the Geneva Conventions, common notions of morality, everything's thrown out the window," says Kucinich. "And what it means is that these private contractors are really an arm of the Administration and its policies."

Kucinich says he plans to investigate the potential involvement of private forces in so-called "black bag," "false flag" or covert operations in Iraq. "What's the difference between covert activities and so-called overt activities which you have no information about? There's no difference," he says. Kucinich also says the problems with contractors are not simply limited to oversight and transparency. "It's the privatization of war," he says. The Administration is "linking private war contractor profits with warmaking. So we're giving incentives for the contractors to lobby the Administration and the Congress to create more opportunities for profits, and those opportunities are more war. And that's why the role of private contractors should be sharply limited by Congress."





about
Jeremy Scahill

Jeremy Scahill, is the author of Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army, published by Nation Books.

He is an award-winning investigative journalist and correspondent for the national radio and TV program Democracy Now!, is a Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute.




ARTICLES BY Jeremy Scahill

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